رابطۀ منِ استعلایی با زمان در اندیشه کانت | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 25، شماره 4، دی 1402، صفحه 163-187 اصل مقاله (2.34 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.341.2877 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| نیره سادات میرموسی* | ||
| استادیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| در نظر کانت، ترکیبْ ساختاری زمانمند دارد. اما منِ استعلایی، که بنیادِ زمانمندی ترکیب است، بیرون از زمان است. در قیاسات تجربه، منِ استعلایی در هیچ یک از حالات زمان (استمرار، توالی و همزمانی) قرار نمیگیرد. منِ استعلایی چگونه میتواند مبنای حکم ترکیبی باشد و در عین حال بیرون از زمان قرار گیرد؟ در این مقاله کوشش شده است تا با بررسی بحث ترکیب و همچنین قیاسات تجربه، نشان دهیم که در زمان نبودنِ منِ استعلایی به معنای قطع پیوند با زمان نیست، زیرا عدم پیوند با زمانْ استعلایی بودنِ من یا سوژۀ شناسا را در فلسفۀ کانت بیمعنا خواهد کرد. بنابراین، منِ استعلایی، اگرچه «در» زمان نیست، اما همواره «با» زمان است. «با» زمان بودن به معنای این است که سوژه، به مثابۀ خودانگیختگی محض، برابربودگی را به واسطۀ زمان وضع میکند. زیرا فقط در این برابربودگی یعنی تعیّنیافتگی در زمان است که وجود پدیدارها و در نتیجه شناخت عینی آنها ممکن میشود. بنابراین، سوژۀ استعلایی به نحو پیشینی با اعطای زمان (زمان به مثابۀ قاعدۀ شهود) به خود بر خود تأثیر میگذارد. بدین معنا، سوژۀ استعلایی، در عینِ خودانگیختگیِ محض، منفعل از زمان و در نتیجه متناهی است. این تناهی، به مثابۀ معیت دائمی با زمان، تضمینکنندۀ استعلای سوژه است. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| من استعلایی؛ زمان؛ استمرار؛ ترکیب؛ قیاسات تجربه؛ کانت | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| متافیزیک | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| The Relation Between Transcendental I and Time in Kant's Thought | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Nayerehsadat Mirmousa | ||
| Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| According to Kant, Synthesis is temporally structured. However, the "transcendental I" which serves as the foundation for temporal Synthesis, is out of time. In the analogies of experience, the "transcendental I" does not put into any moods of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This may seem contradictory, as it raises the question of how the timeless "transcendental I" can form the basis of a synthetic judgment while also being out of time. This article aims to show that, based on the discussion on synthesis and the analogies of experience, the timelessness of the transcendental self does not entail a disconnection from time. Because the disconnection with time will render the transcendence of the self meaningless in Kant's philosophy. Although the "transcendental I" is not "in" time, it is always "with" time. Being "with" time means that the subject, as pure spontaneity, constitutes objectivity through time. This is because the existence of phenomena and their objective knowledge is only possible through objectivity as a determination in time. By giving time to itself a priori, the transcendental self affects itself and thus guarantees its transcendence through its finitude which is the constant companionship to time. Introduction Kant's philosophy posits that every synthesis, such as apprehension, reproduction, or recognition, is temporally structured. However, the unity of these combinations requires the existence of the transcendental self as their a priori ground for knowledge. According to Kant, the transcendental self, as the ground of the temporality of combinations, exists outside of time. In the analogies of experience, Kant goes beyond this and claims that the transcendental self is even outside of any of the modes of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This raises a problem: if the transcendental I is outside of time, then its transcendence would be meaningless in Kant's philosophy. We will show that the synthetic unity of knowledge occurs in all its stages in connection with time. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge depends on the relationship between time and the transcendental self. This article has tried to show with the phenomenological approach and by examining the discussion of synthesis and analogies of experience that the temporality of the transcendental self does not mean its "being in time" but rather, it means the constant companionship of the transcendental self and time itself. The relationship between time and Synthesis According to Kant, multiplicity needs synthesis to be known. The multiplicity of time cannot be understood unless the unity of time is assumed beforehand. The unity of time is the formal and a priori condition of the intuition of all phenomena. The synthesis of apprehension is related to the present. The synthesis of reproduction that is related to the past is the synthesis of the current moments with the previous moments. This is the responsibility of the transcendental imagination. The synthesis of recognition is related to the future because the a priori identity of the two moments will be the end based on which the imagination can order the multiplicity of intuitions (moments). The combination of recognition or the identification of understanding itself requires a fundamental identity that unites all three combinations. This second identity is called “Transcendental Apperception” which according to Kant is outside of time. How can the timeless transcendental self be the ground of the temporal combination? If the transcendental self is outside of time, it is no longer transcendental, and if it is in time, like other phenomena, it becomes an object of knowledge. How can this conflict be resolved in Kant? The answer to this question can be found in the section on analogies of experience. Analogies of experience: relation of time with the transcendental self-consciousness In the analogies of experience, In analogies of experience, Kant talks about the moods of time. The moods of time are persistence, succession, and simultaneity. Even in analogies of experience, although Kant proposes these three modes of time, the above conflict is not resolved. Therefore, not only is the transcendental self not placed in any of the divisions of time, but also according to the analogies of experience, it is not placed in any moods of time. The conflict is resolved only when we note that all three analogies are related to the categories of relation. In addition to being related to the categories of relation, analogies reveal the meaning of "relation"; The "relation" between the subject and the predicate of the sentence and the relationship between the subject and the object in general. The pure unity of time - which is assumed by the transcendental subject - is the necessity that makes possible not only the knowledge of objects but also the realization of objectivity. Therefore, transcendental self-consciousness, as the necessary condition for knowing objects, must always consider its connection with the pure unity of time. If these rules - the analogies of experience - do not exist as transcendental time- determinations, the unity of nature and the temporality of phenomena will be lost. As a result, experience in the sense of a priori synthesis of phenomena also becomes meaningless. Therefore, even though nothing has been directly said about the relationship between time and transcendental self-consciousness in analogies, there is a fundamental connection between transcendental self-consciousness and time. The objectivity of synthetic judgments depends on time; Although, time is neither something outside the transcendental subject nor inside the subject. Rather, time is the way by which the subject affects itself. According to Heidegger, time is the continuous self-affecting of the subject. Conclusion According to what has been said, in the discussion of the analogies, it becomes clear how the transcendental subject, though it is not "in" time, makes it possible to be "in" time, And this is the same constant companionship of the transcendental self with time itself. Time and transcendental self are two sides of a pure combination. The transcendental self makes possible one side of knowledge - that is, subjectivity - and time - the other side - that is, objectivity. Neither time nor the transcendent self is "in" time. At the same time, both of them are a priori to all of the intra-temporal objects. Moreover, the transcendent self is not "in" time but "with" time. And in being with time, The transcendent self can make all the moods of time possible. This companionship means the persistence of the relationship. Finally, only being "with" time can justify the paradox of receptivity of self in intuition and spontaneity of understanding. The transcendental self as pure spontaneity accompanied with time can pose the receptive self in front of itself as objectivity and it guarantees the transcendence of the subject. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Transcendental I, Time, Persistence, Synthesis, Analogies of Experience. Kant | ||
| مراجع | ||
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