وناینواگن، هدایتشدگی الهی و معنای شانس | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 25، شماره 4، دی 1402، صفحه 5-32 اصل مقاله (3.15 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2023.9662.2923 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| محمد ابراهیم مقصودی* 1؛ سید حسن حسینی سروری2 | ||
| 1پژوهشگر مرکز علم و الهیات، پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران | ||
| 2استاد، گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| سازگاریگرایی موضعی است که نظریۀ تکامل و خداباوری مداخلهگرا را جمعپذیر میداند. سازگاریگرایان هدایتشده بودن اجزاء یا ویژگیهای زیستکره را با شانسی بودن فرایند تکاملی جمعپذیر میدانند. پرسش مهم پیش روی سازگاریگرا این است که آیا معنای شانس و هدایتشدگی جمعپذیرند؟ واژۀ «شانس» به چه معناست؟ آیا شانسی بودن به معنای غیرهدایتشده بودن است؟ هدف ما در این نوشتار ارائۀ پاسخی به این پرسشها است. در بررسی این پرسشها، بر پاسخ وناینواگن متمرکز میشویم. او متذکر میشود که (1) واژۀ «شانس» معانی متعددی دارد که (2) برخی از این معانی با هدایتشده بودن جمعپذیر هستند و (3) معنایی از واژۀ «شانس» که در نظریۀ تکامل مد نظر است در این دسته قرار میگیرد. بحث خواهیم کرد که در هر سه مورد حق با وناینواگن است، اما او موفق نشده است که معنای مطلوب سازگاریگرا را ارائه کند. وناینواگن علت نداشتن را با غایت نداشتن خلط کرده است، اما رویکرد او ترمیمپذیر است. استدلال خواهیم کرد که معنای شانس و هدایتشدگی جمعپذیر هستند. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| نظریۀ تکامل؛ خداباوری؛ سازگاریگرایی؛ شانس؛ هدایتشدگی؛ وناینواگن | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه دین | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Van Inwagen, Divine Guidedness, and the Meaning of “Chance” | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mohammad Ebrahim Maghsoudi1؛ Seyed Hassan Hosseini Sarvary2 | ||
| 1Researcher in Center for Science and Theology, Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Professor, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Are the meanings of “chance” and “guidedness” consistent? The goal of this article is to provide an affirmative answer to this question and thereby defend compatibilism (or accommodationism), which is the position that evolutionary theory and interventionist theism can coexist harmoniously. Compatibilists, such as van Inwagen (2003), Bartholomew (2008), Dowe (2011), Bradley (2012), and Sober (2014) argue that certain components or features of the biosphere exhibit both chancy and divinely guided aspects. What is chance? The concept of chance, in its scientific sense, is closely related to the concept of probability. One can interpret the probabilities used in scientific theories ontologically. If so, by “chance” we mean whatever objective property in the world the term “ontological probability” picks out (Suárez, 2022).[1] The received view suggests that chance and randomness are identical but technically speaking, “chance” describes the process that leads to the production of an outcome, while the term “random” describes the outcome itself. (Von Mises’ definition of randomness): A sequence, such as a sequence of zeroes and ones, is considered random when no successful gambling strategy can be made to predict the next number in the sequence. In other words, a sequence is random if it cannot be exploited by a gambling system for prediction. (Eagle, 2021) Furthermore, “chance” is often used synonymously with “coincidence.” Coincidence refers to the co-occurrence of two independent deterministic chains of events. In this sense, being chancy implies having a cause. Sometimes “chancy” is used synonymously with “accidental.” In this sense, a chance event does not possess a specific purpose. It is important to note that not every coincidence is considered an accident (Dowe, 2011). Genetic mutations serve as quintessential examples of chance events in evolutionary theory, as they do not occur in response to environmental threats or opportunities faced by species. In other words, there is no statistical relationship or correlation between the usefulness to a particular species of a potential mutation and the probability of that mutation occurring. The compatibility of “chance” and “guidedness” The incompatibilist might argue that chance processes cannot be divinely guided because the very meaning of being guided is not compatible with the meaning of being chancy. In response, van Inwagen (2003) points out that 1) the term “chancy” has multiple meanings, such that (2) some of these meanings can coexist with the idea of being guided, and (3) the meaning of “chancy” relevant to evolutionary theory falls within this category. Therefore, the argument just presented is not valid. Van Inwagen believes that the compatibilist perspective favors considering “chance” as coincidence. Being a coincidence requires having a cause, but having a cause does not necessarily imply having a purpose or being divinely guided. The question facing the compatibilist is whether chance is compatible with being divinely guided. Hence, van Inwagen mistakenly conflates having a cause with being guided. However, van Inwagen's approach can be modified. There are meanings of “chance” and “guided” according to which these two concepts can be considered compatible. To illustrate this, let’s consider a chain of events as follows: Mutation 1, the occurrence of feature 1 in species A; mutation 2, the occurrence of feature 2 in species B; mutation 3, the occurrence of feature 3 in species A; mutation 4, the occurrence of feature 4 in species C, and so on. This chain is random in the sense that knowing one part of it does not allow for predictions of the next event with significant probability. Genetic mutations are chance events; there is no statistical correlation between the usefulness of a particular mutation and the probability of its occurrence. If such a correlation existed, probabilistic predictions would be possible. However, it can still be argued that this chain is guided, meaning that its members are deliberately chosen by an intelligent agent. Having a pattern is a property that describes the relationship among the members of the sequence while being deliberately chosen is a property that results from the fact that each member, and consequently the whole sequence, is somehow related to an external entity, say an intelligent agent. Thus, there is no prima facie contradiction in considering a sequence of events to be random and at the same time divinely guided. One might object that although it may not seem contradictory at first, no truly random sequence can be guided. However, it remains unclear what kind of argument could support this claim solely through an analysis of the meanings of “chance” and “guidedness.” One might argue that being random suggests a lack of direction while being guided requires having a specific direction. Alternatively, one might argue that being random implies that attempting to regenerate the same sequence via a chance process would most likely fail, whereas being guided suggests otherwise. While these objections carry weight, they all require an additional premise beyond the mere meanings of “chance” and “guidedness.” One way to understand “chancy” as opposed to “guided” is to define chance within the incompatibilist sense as follows: The incompatibilist meaning of “chancy”: not being intentionally brought about by an intelligent agent, either human or non-human, nor being necessitated by the laws of nature. (van Woudenberg, 2013) In this sense, a chance event cannot be guided. However, it is worth noting that evolutionary theory itself does not make any claims about intentional agency. The defender of the incompatibilist meaning seems to have assumed ontological naturalism, but not methodological naturalism. It is evident that ontological naturalists tend to favor the incompatibilist meaning. Van Inwagen (2013) highlights that methodological naturalism does not necessitate a scientific theory to explicitly deny the existence and effects of supernatural agents. If a methodological naturalist wishes to adopt the incompatibilist meaning, she or he must make an additional argument that goes beyond merely considering the meanings of “chance” and “guidedness”. [1]. For a defense of the existence of chance in the world, see van Inwagen (1995), Sober (2010), Bradley (2012), and Emery (2022). | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| the theory of evolution, theism, compatibilism, chance, guidedness, van Inwagen | ||
| مراجع | ||
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زارع، روزبه، و حسینی، سید حسن. (1400). تطور و خداباوری؛ طرح و بررسی دیدگاه الیوت سوبر. معرفت فلسفی، 18(4)، ۱۰۵-۱۱۸.
مشکیباف، فاطمه، خزاعی، زهرا، و لگنهاوزن، محمد. (1402). بخت معرفتی و معرفتشناسی ضد بخت از منظر دانکن پریچارد. پژوهشهای فلسفی-کلامی، 25(2)، 5-32.
https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2023.9322.2878
نریمانی، نیما. (1400). طبیعتگرایی روششناختی در علم. فلسفه علم، 11(21)، 251-278.
https://doi:10.30465/ps.2021.22717.1323 | ||
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