نسبت واقعگرایی علمی با رویکردهای تبیینکنندۀ پیشرفت علم | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 25، شماره 4، دی 1402، صفحه 109-134 اصل مقاله (2.48 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2023.9380.2887 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| سیاوش مزداپور1؛ مصطفی تقوی* 2 | ||
| 1دانشجوی ارشد، گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه شریف، تهران، ایران. | ||
| 2دانشیار، گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه شریف، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| یکی از مهمترین مباحث مطرحشده در مطبوعات فلسفۀ علم مناقشۀ واقعگرایی و پادواقعگرایی علمی است. همچنین در سالهای اخیر ادبیات نسبتاً مفصلی در خصوص رویکردهای تبیینکنندۀ پیشرفت علم به وجود آمده است. هدف این مقاله بررسی نسبت واقعگرایی/پادواقعگرایی علمی با رویکردهای تبیینکنندۀ پیشرفت علم است. در این مقاله منظور از واقعگرایی علمی واقعگرایی معرفتی است، که ادعا میکند نظریات علمیِ بالغ و موفق توصیفی (تقریباً) صادق از جهان ارائه میدهند. در مقابل، مدافعان پادواقعگرایی معرفتی امکان کسب معرفت از هویات مشاهدهناپذیر را رد میکنند. رویکردهای تبیینکنندۀ پیشرفت علم با توجه به هدفی که برای علم در نظر گرفتهاند، در این چهار دسته ارائه شدهاند: رویکرد معرفتی، رویکرد معنایی، رویکرد حل مسئله (کارکردی) و رویکرد مبتنی بر فهم. در این مقاله استدلال میشود که دو رویکرد معرفتی و معنایی با توسل به مفهوم صدق در زمرۀ دیدگاههای واقعگرایانه قرار میگیرند. رویکرد حل مسئله نیز به دلیل جایگزینی معیار توانایی حل مسائل با صدق، رویکردی پادواقعگرایانه به شمار میآید. ادعای اصلی مقاله این است که گرچه در ابتدای امر به نظر میرسد که رویکرد مبتنی بر فهم از مفهوم صدق در شرح دیدگاه خود استفاده کرده، اما نشان داده میشود که این رویکرد در تعیین اولویت میان صدق و فهم، فهم را اولویت خود قرار میدهد. این ادعا بدان معناست که در این رویکرد ملاک انتخاب نظریۀ ارجح نه تقرب به حقیقت، بلکه چگونگی فهم آن است. بنابراین رویکرد مبتنی بر فهم رویکردی پادواقعگرایانه است. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| واقعگرایی علمی؛ پادواقعگرایی علمی؛ پیشرفت علم؛ رویکرد معرفتی؛ رویکرد معنایی؛ رویکرد حل مسئله؛ رویکرد مبتنی بر فهم. | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه علم | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| The Relationship between Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress Accounts | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Siavash Mazdapour1؛ Mostafa Taqavi2 | ||
| 1Master’s Student, Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif Industrial University, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| 2Associate Professor, Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif Industrial University, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| One of the most significant topics in the philosophy of science literature is the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. In recent years, a considerable amount of literature has emerged on scientific progress accounts. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between scientific realism/anti-realism and scientific progress accounts. Scientific realism, in this article, refers to epistemic realism, which posits that mature and successful scientific theories offer an (approximately) true description of the world. In contrast, advocates of epistemic anti-realism reject the possibility of acquiring knowledge about unobservable entities. Scientific progress accounts fall into four categories based on their intended purpose: epistemic, semantic, problem-solving (functional), and noetic. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic accounts, which rely on the concept of truth, are based on scientific realism. The problem-solving account is considered an anti-realistic approach since it replaces the criterion of truth with the ability to solve problems. The primary argument of this article is that although the noetic account appears to use the concept of truth in its explanation, it prioritizes understanding over truth in determining the preferred theory. This means that the criterion for selecting the preferred theory is not approximation to the truth, but rather understanding. As a result, the noetic account is based on an anti-realistic approach. Introduction The thesis of epistemic realism posits that successful and mature scientific theories are (approximately) true. Also, various accounts of scientific progress focus on specific objectives within science. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic approaches align with a realist perspective, while the problem-solving (functional) and noetic accounts have anti-realist foundations. Scientific realism Generally, three theses of scientific realism can be identified: the metaphysical (ontological) thesis, the semantic thesis, and the epistemic thesis. The metaphysical thesis asserts that the world exists independently of the mind. The semantic thesis claims that propositions concerning unobservable entities can be evaluated as true or false implying that all scientific propositions have meaning whether they relate to observable or unobservable entities. The epistemic realism thesis argues that we can acquire knowledge about reality including knowledge about unobservable entities. To be more precise, the claims about theoretical entities in scientific theories are not only meaningful but also provide an almost true depiction of reality. In this article, realism refers specifically to epistemic realism, which encompasses three main aspects: 1) the existence of a mind-independent world, 2) the attribution of truth or falsity to scientific propositions concerning unobservable entities, and 3) the claim that the propositions in mature scientific theories regarding theoretical entities are nearly true. On the other hand, one advocate of epistemic anti-realism is Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. According to this perspective, van Fraassen denies the capacity to acquire knowledge about unobservable levels. In this view, the goal of science is not truth but rather empirical adequacy. This means that the objective of scientific endeavor is not to uncover the truth, but rather to construct models that are empirically sufficient. Scientific progress accounts Regarding the concept of scientific progress, four accounts have been presented. In the epistemic account, the goal of science is to increase knowledge or justified true belief. Therefore, scientific progress occurs as we accumulate knowledge. In the semantic account, the objective of science is to approach closer to the truth (verisimilitude). This implies that science progresses when our theories are more truth-like. In the problem-solving (functional) approach, the concept of truth is set aside, and the focus shifts to problem-solving or fulfilling specific functions within science. In this account, scientific progress is marked by the development of new theories that effectively solve more problems compared to previous ones. In the new functional approach, scientific progress is defined in terms of the usefulness of the problem-defining and problem-solving. Advocates of the noetic account consider increased understanding to be the goal of science. In other words, science advances when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world. Scientific progress accounts and scientific realism In both the epistemic and semantic accounts, truth plays a pivotal role. Justified true belief serves as a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. In the epistemic account, it is possible to acquire knowledge about theoretical entities. Thus, we can infer that the epistemic account is rooted in scientific realism. In the semantic account, the ultimate aim of science is to achieve complete truth. While achieving complete truth in theories may not be certain within this approach, it is possible to demonstrate their approximate truth. Therefore, according to this account, mature scientific theories are considered to be almost true. Consequently, this account aligns with scientific realism. In presenting the problem-solving approach, Laudan explicitly argues against truth being the objective of science, as there is no criterion available to gauge the attainment of truth. In other words, if we define the success of scientific theories based on their ability to solve scientific problems, this success does not necessarily indicate the truth of the theory. While mature scientific theories may demonstrate success and possess the capability to solve numerous problems in comparison to earlier theories, this accomplishment does not directly correlate to the truthfulness of the theory. Consequently, this approach adopts an anti-realist perspective towards science. In the noetic account, priority is given to understanding over approximation to the truth, despite the presence of both criteria. To clarify further, if there are two competing theories, with one being more aligned with reality but the other providing a greater level of understanding, the second theory is considered preferable. Moreover, the concept of the model in the noetic approach resembles the concept of the model in the doctrine of constructive empiricism. This implies that scientific theories do not necessarily provide a true depiction of the world, but rather act as models designed to enhance our understanding. This perspective on scientific theories is anti-realist since it contradicts the thesis of epistemic realism, which asserts that mature scientific theories offer an (almost) true description of the world. Conclusion In summary, this article puts forth the following assertions: l The epistemic and semantic accounts offer explanations for scientific progress within the framework of scientific realism. l The problem-solving (functional) account takes an anti-realist standpoint by explicitly discarding the notion of truth. Although some argue that the new functional approach can be classified as a realistic perspective, the article contends that it still remains anti-realist. l The noetic account inherently embraces an anti-realist position. It considers scientific theories as models that prioritize enhancing understanding rather than providing a relatively accurate description of the world. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| scientific realism, scientific anti-realism, scientific progress, epistemic account, semantic account, problem-solving (functional) account, noetic account | ||
| مراجع | ||
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