Self-Knowledge and Avicenna’s Floating Man Thought Experiment | ||
| پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 27، شماره 1، فروردین 1404، صفحه 119-136 اصل مقاله (1.03 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2025.11486.3154 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Alireza Mazarian* | ||
| Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده | ||
| Avicenna’s floating man thought experiment has been examined and criticized for over a thousand years from various philosophical perspectives. While traditional and modern criticisms exist, the latter primarily focus on the confusion between epistemology and ontology. The ontological dimensions have received significant attention, but the epistemological aspects remain underexplored. I propose a modern critique suggesting that if valid, the thought experiment may not support substance dualism. However, some modest versions could bolster modest dualism, which posits that mental properties are distinct from physical ones, without adhering to Cartesian concepts. I present seven versions of the thought experiment. The first differs from Avicenna’s original and focuses on the individuation of self and body, but is vulnerable to modern critiques due to its conflation of ontological and epistemic aspects. The remaining six versions avoid this issue and do not assert that the mind is an immaterial substance. The second version examines epistemic differences between basic self-knowledge and knowledge of the body. The third addresses self-referential and self-verifying aspects of self-knowledge. The fourth explores modal properties, while the fifth highlights the self's necessary relationship to self-knowledge. The sixth emphasizes the environmental neutrality of basic self-knowledge, and the final version utilizes the self as a critical reasoner. I also support and revise these six versions with eleven general remarks. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| axioms؛ intersubjective؛ validation؛ intuitive؛ knowledge-by-presence؛ Mullā Ṣadrā | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| معرفت شناسی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Self-Knowledge and Avicenna’s Floating Man Thought Experiment | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Alireza Mazarian | ||
| Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Avicenna’s floating man thought experiment has been examined and criticized for over a thousand years from various philosophical perspectives. While traditional and modern criticisms exist, the latter primarily focus on the confusion between epistemology and ontology. The ontological dimensions have received significant attention, but the epistemological aspects remain underexplored. I propose a modern critique suggesting that if valid, the thought experiment may not support substance dualism. However, some modest versions could bolster modest dualism, which posits that mental properties are distinct from physical ones, without adhering to Cartesian concepts. I present seven versions of the thought experiment. The first differs from Avicenna’s original and focuses on the individuation of self and body, but is vulnerable to modern critiques due to its conflation of ontological and epistemic aspects. The remaining six versions avoid this issue and do not assert that the mind is an immaterial substance. The second version examines epistemic differences between basic self-knowledge and knowledge of the body. The third addresses self-referential and self-verifying aspects of self-knowledge. The fourth explores modal properties, while the fifth highlights the self's necessary relationship to self-knowledge. The sixth emphasizes the environmental neutrality of basic self-knowledge, and the final version utilizes the self as a critical reasoner. I also support and revise these six versions with eleven general remarks. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| axioms, intersubjective, validation, intuitive, knowledge-by-presence, Mullā Ṣadrā | ||
| مراجع | ||
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