تأملی در اِعمال اصل احتیاطی در تنظیم محصولات اصلاحشدۀ ژنتیکی (تراریخته) | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 26، شماره 4، دی 1403، صفحه 135-164 اصل مقاله (2.22 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2025.11379.3132 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| حامد بیکران بهشت* | ||
| استادیار، گروه مطالعات نظری علم، فناوری و نوآوری، مؤسسه تحقیقات سیاست علمی کشور، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| یکی از پیشرفتهای مهم در زیستشناسی مولکولی در چند دهۀ اخیر امکان اصلاح ژنتیکیِ انداموارهها با فناوریهای مختلفِ مهندسی ژنتیک بوده است. به طور خاص، محصولات اصلاحشدۀ ژنتیکیِ (GM) متعددی با افزودن ژنها یا ویرایش ژنومِ محصولات موجود، و با هدف افزایش بهرهوری در کشت یا افزایش ارزش غذایی آنها، توسط مراکز تحقیقاتی و شرکتهای زیستفناوری عرضه شدهاند. اما این محصولات با واکنشهای گستردۀ مخالفانی مواجه شدهاند که خطرات احتمالیِ آنها را برای سلامت انسان و یا محیطزیست جدی میدانند. بسیاری از مخالفان محصولات GM به اصل احتیاطی متوسل میشوند که بر اساس نسخۀ رایجی از آن، در شرایط امکان مخاطرات جدی، حتی با وجود عدمقطعیت علمی، نباید اقدامات احتیاطی را به تعویق انداخت. یکی از نقدهای مهم بر اصل احتیاطی مشکل دوراهی است: هر نسخهای از این اصل یا چنان ضعیف است که بیاثر است و مورد پذیرش طرفدارانش نیست، یا تجویزهای سیاستیِ متعارضی از آن نتیجه میشود. حالت اخیر به پارادوکس احتیاطی مشهور است. در این مقاله، پس از بررسی اصل احتیاطی، مشکل دوراهی، و پارادوکس احتیاطی، ملاحظات مربوط به اِعمال این اصل بر محصولات GM بررسی شده، و راهحلی برای مشکل دوراهی پیشنهاد میشود که به ویژه در مورد محصولات GM موفق به نظر میرسد. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| محصولات اصلاحشدۀ ژنتیکی؛ اصل احتیاطی؛ مطلوبیت مورد انتظار؛ عدمقطعیت؛ مشکل دوراهی؛ پارادوکس احتیاطی | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه علم | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| A Reflection on the Application of the Precautionary Principle in the Regulation of Genetically Modified (GM) Crops | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht | ||
| Assistant Professor, Department of Theory-Oriented STI Studies, National Research Institute for Science Policy (NRISP), Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| One of the most significant developments in molecular biology in the last few decades has been the genetic modification of various organisms with different genetic engineering technologies. In particular, biotechnology companies and research centers have developed multiple genetically modified (GM) crops by inserting genes or editing the genome of existing crops to enhance their productivity or nutritional value. However, these products have faced strong opposition from those who consider their potential risks to human health or the environment seriously. Many opponents of GM products appeal to the precautionary principle. A serious objection to the principle is the following dilemma: any version of this principle either is so weak—so ineffective that it will not probably be accepted by its proponents—or it results in conflicting policy prescriptions. The latter situation is known as the precautionary paradox. In this article, after examining the precautionary principle, the dilemma objection, and the precautionary paradox, the considerations related to applying the principle to GM products are discussed, and a solution to the dilemma objection is proposed, which seems to be particularly successful in the case of GM products. Introduction The precautionary principle requires that if an activity poses a threat to the environment or human health, precautionary measures must be taken even if there is no scientifically established causal relationship between the activity and the possible threat. The principle, which is a qualitative decision rule with multiple (stronger or weaker) versions, is being challenged by the so-called dilemma objection. According to this objection, any version of the principle is either too weak to be accepted by its advocates (as an independent decision rule) or so strong that it confronts the precautionary paradox; the paradox that applying the principle to an activity and the prescribed precautionary measure will result in inconsistent prescriptions. Resolving the precautionary paradox has been the primary focus of efforts to address the dilemma objection, and it is commonly held that pursuing the first horn of the dilemma will not lead to an appropriate resolution of the objection. In this paper, my focus is on the first horn of the dilemma and I argue that a “weak” version of the principle, which is close to the classical principle of maximizing the expected utility (PMEU), could still be a viable option for resolving the dilemma. Precautionary Principle, Dilemma Objection, and the Precautionary Paradox When there is considerable uncertainty, the precautionary principle as a qualitative decision rule is a prime candidate for decision-making—where, due to the lack of reliable estimates for the relevant probabilities, PMEU cannot be applied. Some general formulations for the principle have been proposed as it has multiple versions. Manson’s formulation consists of three parts: the damage condition, the knowledge condition, and the remedy. The damage condition is a requirement that the potentially harmful effect must satisfy in order to apply the principle. The knowledge condition is a requirement that the relationship between an activity and its potential harmful effect must satisfy in order to apply the principle. The third part is a remedy that must be taken whenever the damage and knowledge conditions are satisfied. It is possible to specify stronger or weaker versions of these conditions and the remedy, leading to different principles with different strengths: - The weaker the knowledge condition, the stronger the resultant principle; - The weaker the harm condition, the stronger the resultant principle; - And the stricter the remedy, the stronger the resultant principle. The principle is then confronted with a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma is that a weaker version of the principle cannot count as an independent decision rule. The second horn is that a stronger version of the principle is subject to the precautionary paradox: applying the principle to an activity and the prescribed remedy will result in inconsistent prescriptions. Those who oppose genetically modified (GM) crops commonly appeal to the precautionary principle to call for a ban on these products. They claim that these products can cause a range of dangers, including gene flow, superweeds, biodiversity loss, marker gene effects, and health risks. However, the dilemma objection is even more evident and more serious when applying the precautionary principle to the cultivation or consumption of GM crops. It is because, the proponents of these products argue, they can play an important role in eliminating hunger worldwide. Thus, banning the production of GM crops might have serious harmful effects, which calls for a second application of the precautionary principle. The “Weak” Precautionary Principle A number of solutions have been suggested for the dilemma objection, most of which tackle the second horn. As the discussions concerning these solutions indicate, it seems that none of them are promising. I argue that the best way to address this problem is to follow the first horn, which is to adopt a “weak” version of the precautionary principle and demonstrate how it can be rational and viable. Thus, I argue that a “weak” precautionary principle is not necessarily unacceptable. To do so, I will focus on what “weakness” may mean in a “weak” precautionary principle. The strength of the precautionary principle can be determined by two factors: application domain and prescription. First, the application domain of a principle is determined by the extent to which cases fall within its scope. Weak harm and knowledge conditions result in more activities being subject to applying the principle, and vice versa. Second, the prescription of a remedy that places more restrictive and costly limits on an activity for a longer period can result in a stronger principle, and vice versa. Thus, an actually weak precautionary principle is a principle with a limited scope and a less restrictive and costly prescription for a short period of time. To evaluate this characterization, let’s consider three cases: i) Knowledge and harm conditions are characterized in a weak sense (leading to a wide application domain), and the remedy only prescribes monitoring the effects of the activity for a short period; ii) Knowledge and harm conditions are strictly characterized (leading to a narrow application domain), and the remedy prescribes a permanent ban on the activity; iii) Knowledge and harm conditions are strictly characterized (leading to a narrow application domain), and the remedy only prescribes monitoring the effects of the activity for a short period. Cases (i) and (ii) do not describe weak principles: the wide application domain of case (i) ultimately results in high costs; and despite having a narrow application domain, case (ii) again imposes high costs for long periods because of its strict prescription. Case (iii) constitutes a weak principle: it has only a moderate prescription for a short period of time. However, in the dilemma objection, “strength” is primarily a matter of whether and to what extent a precautionary principle can be considered an independent principle from the PMEU. In this sense, (i), (ii), and (iii) could be seen as describing “weak” principles, and (iii) would be the “weakest.” Now, consider the following case: iv) Knowledge and harm conditions are characterized in a weak sense (leading to a wide application domain), and the remedy prescribes taking into account the imprecise (subjective) probabilities of uncertain risks of the possible harmful effects of the activity when calculating the expected utilities. Case (iv) describes an epistemic understanding of the precautionary principle. Although it is “weaker” than (iii), (iv) may even result in remedies that are as restrictive and costly as banning the activity. Thus, (iv) is not weak at all. Case (iv) may be seen as an outcome of following the first horn of the dilemma objection. It seems to provide a principle that is not “strong” in the sense discussed about the dilemma objection, but at the same time, it is not weak and (thus) unacceptable. This suggestion seems to be a viable solution for the GM case. First, those who oppose GM products bring up evidence of their risks. Their subjective probabilities can be used to calculate the relevant expected utilities. Second, the proponents of GM products mention the impact of not cultivating these products on global hunger. Their subjective probabilities can also be used to calculate the relevant expected utilities. PMEU will serve as the final arbiter. Conclusion It seems that the most promising solution to the dilemma objection can only be obtained by following the first horn. As argued, the epistemic understanding of the precautionary principle provides a “weak” version of the principle, which is neither weak nor unacceptable. And it seems to be an especially viable solution for the GM case. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| genetically modified crops, precautionary principle, expected utility, uncertainty, dilemma objection, precautionary paradox | ||
| مراجع | ||
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