رویکرد فردگرایی نهادی به تکنولوژی | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 26، شماره 4، دی 1403، صفحه 109-134 اصل مقاله (2.05 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2025.11412.3143 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| علیرضا منصوری* | ||
| دانشیار، گروه فلسفۀ علم و تکنولوژی، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| مقالۀ حاضر در جستجوی ارایۀ یک روششناسی مناسب برای بررسی ابعاد اجتماعی و اخلاقی تکنولوژی است. این مقاله استدلال میکند، از آنجا که تکنولوژیها درون سیستمهای اجتماعی-تکنیکی عمل میکنند، بنابراین تحت تأثیر مصنوعات، عاملانِ انسانی، ارزشها، هنجارها، رویهها و نهادها قرار دارند. به این اعتبار، توضیح ابعاد اجتماعی و اخلاقی تکنولوژی نیازمند یک روششناسی است که بتواند تعامل بین مصنوعات، نهادها و عاملهای انسانی را نیز شامل شود. این توضیح ناگزیر باید مؤلفۀ حیث التفاتیِ هستیشناسی تکنولوژی را در نظر بگیرد. بر این اساس، مقالۀ حاضر، فردگرایی نهادی را که بر اهمیت عاملیت فردی در چارچوبهای نهادی تأکید میورزد، به عنوان رویکردی مناسب پیشنهاد میکند. علاوه بر این، در این تحقیق، پیامدهای فلسفیِ پذیرش این روششناسی، از جمله تأثیر آن بر مسئولیت اخلاقی، بررسی میشود. این مقاله نتیجه میگیرد که هرچند همچنان مسئولیت اخلاقی بر دوش افراد است، رویکردی متعادل به اخلاق تکنولوژی نباید از تأثیر نهادها بر کنش افراد غفلت کند، و آموزش اخلاقی را باید هم در سطح افراد و هم در سطح نهادهای درگیر در تکنولوژی ترویج کند. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| تکنولوژی؛ فردگرایی نهادی؛ مصنوعات؛ حیث التفاتی؛ فردگرایی روششناختی؛ عقلانیت نقاد | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه علم | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| An Institutional Individualist Approach to Technology | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Alireza Mansouri | ||
| Associate Professor, Philosophy of Science and Technology Department, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| This paper investigates an adequate methodology for examining the social and ethical dimensions of technology, highlighting the significant role of intentionality in the ontology of technology. The paper argues that since technology is deeply embedded in socio-technical systems, it is influenced by artifacts, human actors, values, norms, practices, and institutions. Explaining the social and ethical aspects of technology requires a methodology that respects its intentional aspect and accounts for the interactions between artifacts, institutions, and human agents. We propose that institutional individualism, which emphasizes the significance of individual agency within institutional frameworks, serves as a suitable approach. Additionally, we explore the philosophical implications of adopting this methodology, including its impact on moral responsibility. The paper concludes that although moral responsibility still rests on individuals, a balanced approach to the ethics of technology should not overlook the influence of institutions on individual actions. Ethical education should be promoted both at the individual level and within the institutions involved in technology. Introduction A comprehensive understanding of technological phenomenon necessitates an exploration beyond mere technical analysis, encompassing its social dimensions. A pivotal inquiry in this context is to consider whether technological phenomena are governed by individual choices or by social structures. To adequately address this inquiry, it is imperative to delineate the ontology of technology. Should technology be perceived as an extension of human agency, or as an integral component of a socio-technical system? This article suggests that institutional individualism constitutes a suitable framework for the study of technological phenomena, as it considers both individual and institutional elements. This approach provides an account of technology which consists of its social and ethical implications. The Ontological Status of Socio-Technical Systems Socio-technical systems encompass artifacts and institutions characterized by intertwined physical and social dimensions (Vermaas et al., 2011). Technical artifacts, such as computers, possess intentional components derived from the intentions of their designers and users (Kroes & Meijers, 2006; Kroes, 2010; Juvshik, 2021; Hilpinen, 2011; Mansouri & Tayebi, 2023). These intentional components determine the functionality, meaning, and impact of technologies. Both social institutions and technical artifacts rely on human constitutive rules and intentionality for their functions and meanings. The distinction lies in the fact that technical artifacts depend on individual intentionality, whereas institutions are contingent upon collective intentionality (Juvshik, 2023; 2021; Thomasson, 2007; 2009; Hindriks, 2018). Socio-technical systems represent intricate networks where institutions, agents, and technical artifacts interact and co-evolve. These systems are constituted through collective intentionality and constitutive rules that confer status functions and deontic powers (Searle, 1995; 2005; 2010). Institutional Individualism: A Methodological Approach to Socio-Technical Systems Institutional individualism, a modified form of methodological individualism (Popper, 1957; Agassi, 1960; 1975; Neck, 2021), presents a framework for studying technological phenomena within socio-technical systems. Distinct from purely collectivist or individualist methodologies, this approach foregrounds the intricate interdependencies between individual agency and institutional structures. By incorporating the reciprocal dynamics of individual actions and institutional contexts, institutional individualism offers a nuanced understanding of socio-technical systems. From this vantage point, technologies transcend their characterization as mere physical artifacts or abstract instruments. They constitute integral components of complex networks that encompass values, norms, institutional arrangements, and individuals’ intentional states. Unlike Hegelian and Marxist perspectives (Marcuse, 1964; Wang & Stokhof, 2022; van Vleet, 2018), which often marginalize individual agency in favor of structural or historical determinism, institutional individualism emphasizes the critical role of individual decision-making and behavior in driving the evolution of socio-technical systems. Simultaneously, it does not disregard the formative role of institutions, recognizing that while institutions shape individual behaviors, they are also subject to modification through individual actions (Mandelbaum, 1955; Searle, 2005, 23; Miller, 1978, 387-414; Hayek, 1955; 1967; Agassi, 1975). Institutional individualism, by its dual focus on individual and institutional dynamics, enables a more thorough examination of the social and ethical implications of technologies, making it a valuable methodological approach for contemporary socio-technical analysis. Consequences for Moral Responsibility Institutional individualism recognizes that ethical considerations in technology encompass both individual actions and collective structures. Therefore, ethical responsibility is not solely on individual designers, engineers, and users, but also on institutions that shape the development and deployment of technology. The institutional aspect of institutional individualism emphasizes the creation of a set of rules and norms that guide behavior, often accompanied by certain consequences and ethical responsibilities. If we accept that institutions, norms, and social roles are part of reality, then ethical obligations are intertwined with them. Ethical responsibility is not just an individual matter but arises from our participation in these shared structures. In a socio-technical system, the deontic powers associated with institutional roles create reasons for action independent of personal desires. This means that individuals have reasons to act not just based on personal desires but on the obligations and duties assigned by institutional roles. Therefore, institutions and socio-technical systems inherently play a role in ethical outcomes. When individuals occupy specific roles within institutions, they face particular responsibilities, and their actions in these roles can have ethical consequences. Thus, as Agassi (1975) argues, ethical responsibility is a balance between individual autonomy and social impact, and individuals determine their ethical responsibilities in relation to their community, combining individual ethics with collective considerations. On the other hand, the individual aspect of institutional individualism emphasizes that ethical considerations in technology ultimately depend on individual actions and intentions. This highlights the importance of individual actions in explaining the social aspects and consequences of socio-technical systems. In socio-technical systems, while recognizing the collective nature of institutional realities, we must also acknowledge that these realities stem from the actions and attitudes of individuals. Each individual contributes to the system, and this contribution carries ethical weight. Searle’s view has significant implications for ethical responsibility. According to Searle, ethical responsibility is tied to individual agency and choice, and institutions and systems are composed of individuals, so any responsibility must ultimately be traced back to individual actions and intentions. He argues that ethical responsibility is a matter of rationality, and individuals are responsible for actions they perform based on their values. Conclusion The pursuit of a balanced methodology to address the social and ethical dimensions of technological phenomena is rooted in a nuanced understanding of the ontology of technology, wherein intentionality occupies a central role. This paper posits institutional individualism as an effective analytical framework for examining the complex interactions between artifacts, institutions, and human agents. By accommodating both the individual and collective aspects of technologies, institutional individualism facilitates a balanced perspective that integrates ethical considerations. Institutional individualism bridges the dual demands of recognizing institutional and collective pressures while upholding the capacity for individual agency. Unlike frameworks that attribute moral responsibility to socio-technical systems as collective entities, institutional individualism reorients responsibility to individual actions and intentions, acknowledging that socio-technical systems are fundamentally composed of human agents. Within such systems, the moral responsibility of individuals emerges through their contributions to the functionality and efficacy of the collective. The rejection of methodological holism aligns with a critique of the concept of extended agency, which seeks to attribute responsibility to supra-individual entities. Institutional individualism reaffirms that moral responsibility is intrinsically tied to individual choices and behaviors, despite the shaping influence of institutions. The operational effectiveness of institutions, therefore, depends on the ethical participation of individuals, reflecting the profound interdependence of ethics and institutional frameworks. This perspective challenges reductive approaches and emphasizes the importance of ethical accountability in socio-technical contexts. Any methodological approach to technology must incorporate these dimensions in a balanced manner, providing a robust account of moral responsibility. Such an approach is essential for understanding the interplay of individual agency and institutional influence in the ethics of technology, ultimately fostering a comprehensive view of responsibility in the context of ever-evolving technological systems. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| technology, institutional individualism, artifacts, intentionality, methodological individualism, critical rationalism | ||
| مراجع | ||
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