An Intersubjective Approach in the Validation of Axioms Considering Islamic Philosophy | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 27، شماره 1، فروردین 1404، صفحه 5-20 اصل مقاله (1.14 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.11226.3119 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| Mehran Rezaee1؛ Eisa Mohammadinia* 1؛ Mahdi Emami Jome2 | ||
| 1Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran | ||
| 2Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Education of Ahl al-Bayt (AS), University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| چکیده | ||
| Axioms are crucial to epistemic frameworks, as several schools of the history of science have recognized. The issue of the current research is that in the validation of axioms, what defects does the intuitive approach entail, and how can the intersubjective approach (based on the ideas of Islamic philosophers) be explained as an alternative, less-known system? The former is dedicated to clarifying and criticizing what is called the intuitive approach to validating axioms: this approach is attributed to classical philosophers and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions whose truth is immediately evident upon taking into account the terms they are based on. The latter focuses on clarifying the alternative approach, called the intersubjective approach of validating axioms (IAVA): this approach is attributed to a specific Islamic tradition, developed by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions that cannot be rationally proved, denied, or doubted, without being already assumed. In this article, we present the intersubjective approach from a historical point of view. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| axioms؛ intersubjective؛ validation؛ intuitive؛ knowledge-by-presence؛ Mullā Ṣadrā | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| منطق | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| An Intersubjective Approach in the Validation of Axioms Considering Islamic Philosophy | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mehran Rezaee1؛ Eisa Mohammadinia1؛ Mahdi Emami Jome2 | ||
| 1Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran | ||
| 2Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Education of Ahl al-Bayt (AS), University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Axioms are crucial to epistemic frameworks, as several schools of the history of science have recognized. The issue of the current research is that in the validation of axioms, what defects does the intuitive approach entail, and how can the intersubjective approach (based on the ideas of Islamic philosophers) be explained as an alternative, less-known system? The former is dedicated to clarifying and criticizing what is called the intuitive approach to validating axioms: this approach is attributed to classical philosophers and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions whose truth is immediately evident upon taking into account the terms they are based on. The latter focuses on clarifying the alternative approach, called the intersubjective approach of validating axioms (IAVA): this approach is attributed to a specific Islamic tradition, developed by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions that cannot be rationally proved, denied, or doubted, without being already assumed. In this article, we present the intersubjective approach from a historical point of view. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| axioms, intersubjective, validation, intuitive, knowledge-by-presence, Mullā Ṣadrā | ||
| مراجع | ||
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