پروتاگوراس: پیشگام نسبیگرایی یا شکاکیت پورونی؟ | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 27، شماره 2، تیر 1404، صفحه 33-64 اصل مقاله (2.37 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.10816.3071 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| ایمان خدافرد1؛ سعید بینای مطلق2؛ رضا کورنگ بهشتی* 3؛ امیراحسان کرباسی زاده4 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران | ||
| 2استاد، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران | ||
| 3استادیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران | ||
| 4دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| پروتاگوراس را اغلب نسبیگرا به شمار آوردهاند، چون او معتقد بود که «انسان معیار همه چیز است، معیار چیزهایی که هستند اینکه هستند و معیار چیزهایی که نیستند اینکه نیستند». در این مقاله نشان دادهایم که تمرکز بسیار بر این قول موجب شده است که دیگر اقوالِ هموزنِ پروتاگوراس در بابِ معرفت در تفسیر اندیشۀ وی مورد توجه قرار نگیرد. به منظورِ تقویت این ادعا، نخست به بررسی تفاسیری پرداختهایم که منکر نسبیگرا بودنِ پروتاگوراساند. سپس کوشیدهایم با استفاده از دیگر اقوال منتسب به پروتاگوراس نشان دهیم که تفسیر نسبیگرایانۀ پروتاگوراس، که صرفاً مبتنی بر قولِ معروف وی است، تصویری ناقص و حتی معیوب از نگاه وی در بابِ معرفت ارائه میکند. زیرا آن قولِ معروف را میتوان در پرتو دیگر اقوالِ هموزنِ پروتاگوراس در بابِ معرفت شکاکانه تفسیر کرد، اما آن دیگر اقوالِ هموزن را نمیتوان نسبیگرایانه تعبیر کرد. در این چهارچوبِ تازه، آنچه در غیاب دیگر آرای پروتاگوراس در بابِ معرفت، نخستین صورتبندیِ نسبیگرایی تلقی شده پیشنمون و صورتبندیِ کلیِ الگوهای دهگانۀ استدلال شکاکانۀ آینسیدموس قلمداد میشود. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| پروتاگوراس؛ افلاطون؛ نسبیگرایی؛ شکاکیت پورونی؛ سکستوس امپیریکوس؛ امور واضح؛ اپوخه | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| معرفت شناسی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Protagoras: Pioneer of Relativism or Pyrrhonian Skepticism? | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Iman Khodafard1؛ Saeed Bina-ye-Motlagh2؛ Reza Koorang Beheshti3؛ Amir Ehsan Karbasizadeh4 | ||
| 1PhD Candidate of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| 2Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran. | ||
| 3Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| 4Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Protagoras has often been considered a relativist because he believed that man is the measure of all things (MM). This paper aims to show that focusing on MM and ignoring his other claims, which should be taken to be as epistemologically important as MM, has been the basis of this interpretation. First, in order to weaken the relativistic account, it has been shown that the only interpretation of MM is not a relativistic one. Second, focusing on the other epistemological fragments attributed to Protagoras, it has been claimed that a skeptical interpretation is a more consistent reading of Protagoras, since MM can be read as a skeptical fragment, but the others cannot be interpreted as relativistic slogans. The most important of these fragments, which we call Protagorean Epochē (PE), is doubt about the being and essence of gods in a Sextan conceptual framework. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, MM is the general form of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemean skeptical arguments. Thus, it leads to suspension of judgment instead of relativism. Introduction The aim of this paper is to show that reading Protagoras as a protagonist of skepticism is more reasonable than considering him as a relativist. In this regard, firstly, we try to show what is problematic with interpreting him as a relativist. We then argue that some skeptical features can be found in Protagoras’s fragments. At last, we don’t claim that Protagoras is a Pyrrhonian skeptic but that at the base of Pyrrhonian skepticism we can find the slogans and strategies which Protagoras introduced to the history of philosophy and especially to Ancient Skepticism. MM and PE as Two General Rules for Two Different Kinds of Objects of Investigation In the history of philosophy, the name of Protagoras has been attached to a famous slogan which says MM (Man is Measure): Of all things, the measure is man; of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not. MM has mostly been interpreted as the first formulation of relativism. However, besides MM, there are some fragments attributed to Protagoras, which are related to the realm of epistemology, that have received the least amount of attention in literature. One of the most important of them is the following: PE (Protagorean Epochē): About the gods, I am able to know neither that they exist nor that they do not exist nor of what kind they are in form; for many things prevent me from knowing this, its ἀδηλόντης and the brevity of man’s life. It can be asked, i) why MM has been considered the focal point of Protagoras’s epistemology and, ii) why it has been interpreted as the first formulation of relativism. We argue that perhaps Plato’s Theaetetus is responsible for both. We claim that, considering PE, MM can be read skeptically, but PE cannot be read relativistically. Therefore, in order to give a consistent interpretation of his fragments, it is better to read MM in a skeptical fashion. But to show the skeptical burden of PE, we have called attention to the Pyrrhonian terminology which can be found in the word “ἀδηλόντης” (being unclear) in the mentioned fragment. Sextus Empiricus, the author of one of the longest treatises on Pyrrhonian skepticism, referring to the object of investigation, uses this word frequently and consciously as a term, against something which is πρόδηλον (clear). And in AM VIII.145, he introduces three types of unclear or non-evident things: 1) absolutely non-evident, 2) naturally non-evident, and 3) temporarily non-evident. (1) and (2) are the objects of scientific and philosophical investigations. And a skeptic, unlike a dogmatist, thinks that finding the truth about these two kinds of objects is a long-term investigation which may be fruitful or not. This is why a skeptic suspends judgment about them. Being non-evident in conjunction with the brevity of man’s life can show that God as a subject of philosophical investigation is not absolutely unknowable, but it needs a long period of investigation so that we cannot determine if it is knowable at last or not. Thus, the result is a suspension of judgment. If we consider PE as the focal point of interpreting Protagoras’s epistemology, it should be read as a general claim about unclear or non-evident objects and MM as a general claim about clear objects. Thus, we have MM* as follows: MM* (Man is a measure of clear objects): Of all clear things, the measure is man; of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not. Following MM* does not force us to limit the scope of clear objects to perceptible things. And the same is correct about unclear objects which are not limited to imperceptible things. So the clear-unclear distinction is not a parallel for perceptible-imperceptible things. Therefore, this line of interpretation is not necessarily equal to the thesis of Theaetetus that knowledge is perception. The Other Skeptical Strategies In order to support reading Protagoras as a prototype of Pyrrhonian skepticism, it has been mentioned in three steps (I–III) some phrases in fragments attributed to Protagoras which are similar, both in formulation and meaning, to some Pyrrhonian slogans and strategies. (I) Sextus Empiricus in PH I.12 says that “[t]he chief constitutive principle of skepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed.” According to Diogenes Laertius (DL, ix.51) Protagoras “was the first to say that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other; he even conducted his arguments in this manner, being the first to do so.” From this quote, we can approach the Ten Modes of Skepticism attributed to Aenesidemus in a straightforward manner. Modes of Skepticism are some argumentative patterns in order to make a contrast between two phenomena or two statements or between a phenomenon and a statement. As Annas and Barnes (1985, pp. 24-25) say, they generally have the following structure: (1) x appears F in situation S. (2) x appears F* in situation S*. Where “F and F* designate incompatible properties,” and “S and S* designate different situations,” and “‘in situation…’” is a shorthand for “depending on situation… (Annas & Barnes, 1985, pp. 24-25).” Since Sextus Empiricus calls Protagoras’s book (i.e., Truth) Καταβάλλοντες (Knockdown Arguments), Lee claims that the book Truth had such a structure and it contained some Antilogiai or opposing arguments (Lee, 2005, p. 29). (II) In the first book of Outlines of Skepticism, Sextus introduces some skeptical phrases such as “I determine nothing” or “everything is inapprehensible.” In brief, it can be said that skeptical phrases are some temporary results of skeptical investigations. They are “temporary” because, in that part of PH, Sextus is at pains to formulate them so that they are not universal or necessary results. In other words, with some temporal and phenomenal adverbs, he makes them phenomenal or non-epistemic claims. The first skeptical phrase Sextus Empiricus introduces in PH I.188 is “οὐ μᾶλλον / ou mallon or οὐδὲν μᾶλλον / ouden mallon. As he says, these phrases are elliptical and by using them, he means “no more this than that.” That is to say, using these phrases, he means: I do not know which of these things I should assent to and which not assent to (PH, I.191). Plutarch in Reply to Colotes (1109) attributed using οὐ μᾶλλον / ou mallon to Protagoras. These phrases are important in ancient skepticism because they are a route to the suspension of judgment. (III) After introducing four groups of the Modes of Skepticism in the first book of PH, which can be used as a skeptical toolkit to argue against dogmatists, Sextus Empiricus devoted the main part of his writings to attacking the professors of theoretical disciplines in detail. As Lee (2005, pp. 39-41) argues, writing against or attacking “those who claim special epistemic authority” is a strategy that we find starts in Protagoras’s writings. Conclusion In conclusion, since there are other fragments attributed to Protagoras related to his epistemology and they have a skeptical burden, if we would like to give a consistent and uniform interpretation of his epistemology, then MM cannot be read as the first formulation of relativism anymore. Because MM can be read skeptically, but PE cannot be read relativistically. Notwithstanding, we don’t claim that Protagoras is a full-fledged Pyrrhonian skeptic, but that the Pyrrhonian strategies in order to weaken the dogmatic claims originally come from Protagoras as the first sophist and skeptic. The Ten Modes of Skepticism (attributed to Aenesidemus), arguing against the professors of theoretical disciplines and suspending judgment about non-evident objects of investigations, are the most important strategies that originally come from Protagorean skepticism. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Protagoras, Plato, relativism, Pyrrhonian skepticism, Sextus Empiricus, prodēlos, epochē | ||
| مراجع | ||
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