Understanding the Self from the Embodied Cognition Paradigm | ||
| پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 26، شماره 1، فروردین 1403، صفحه 121-140 اصل مقاله (1.49 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.9899.2947 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Akhil Kumar Singh* | ||
| Research Associate, Centre for Human Sciences, Rishihood University, Sonipat, Haryana, India. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| Over the centuries, the concept of the self has remained a prominent subject of philosophical inquiry. However, recent years have witnessed a notable shift, with empirical investigations in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology directing their focus toward unraveling the mysteries of the self. These multidisciplinary endeavors have yielded profound insights into the nature of the self, particularly its intricate connection to the physical body. This article centers on a prevailing theory in contemporary discourse: the concept of the embodied self. Central to this theory is the proposition that the self is not an abstract entity but is fundamentally constituted by and inseparably linked with the corporeal form. The article provides an analytical examination of the theoretical scaffolding supporting this theory, drawing substantiation from recent empirical studies spanning diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Additionally, it delves into the realm of phenomenology, briefly delving into Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contributions. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| Philosophy of mind؛ Embodied self؛ Illusion of self؛ Phenomenology؛ Cognitive neuroscience | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه ذهن | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Understanding the Self from Embodied Cognition Paradigm | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Akhil Kumar Singh | ||
| Research Associate, Centre for Human Sciences, Rishihood University, Sonipat, Haryana, India. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Over the centuries, the concept of the self has remained a prominent subject of philosophical inquiry. However, recent years have witnessed a notable shift, with empirical investigations in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology directing their focus toward unravelling the mysteries of the self. These multidisciplinary endeavours have yielded profound insights into the nature of the self, particularly its intricate connection to the physical body. This article centres on a prevailing theory in contemporary discourse: the concept of the embodied self. Central to this theory is the proposition that the self is not an abstract entity but is fundamentally constituted by and inseparably linked with the corporeal form. The article provides an analytical examination of the theoretical scaffolding supporting this theory, drawing substantiation from recent empirical studies spanning diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Additionally, it delves into the realm of phenomenology, briefly delving into Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contributions. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| philosophy of mind, embodied self, illusion of self, phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, mind-body relationship | ||
| مراجع | ||
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