تحلیل تطبیقی اثر نظریه علیت اشرابی بر غایت‌شناسی طبیعی دکارت و سوارز | ||
| پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 26، شماره 2، تیر 1403، صفحه 79-100 اصل مقاله (2.12 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.9620.2916 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| محمدعلی سلطان‌مرادی1؛ یوسف شاقول* 2؛ غلامحسین توکلی3 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه غرب، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. | ||
| 2دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران | ||
| 3دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| فرانسیسکو سوارز با ابداع نظریۀ علیت اشرابی ادعا کرد که علل اربعه وجود را به معلول اشراب می‌کنند. بدین ترتیب، نظریه اشرابی علّیت مفهوم هر چهار علّت -به ویژه علّت غایی- را شبیه علّت فاعلی می‌گرداند. از این رهگذر، سوارز می‌توانست در فلسفۀ خود ارادۀ آزاد و بی‌غایت الهی را با کنش غایتمند او در طبیعت جمع کند. دکارت نیز، با تأثیرپذیری از نظریه اشراب، علت غایی را از فلسفه خود حذف کرد تا راه را برای توضیح مکانیکی طبیعت هموار نماید. بدین نحو نظریه‌ای که با اهدافی الهیاتی ابداع شده بود، مبنای توضیح علمی طبیعت قرار گرفت. در این پژوهش تفاوت‌ها و شباهت‌های غایت‌شناسی طبیعی را در متافیزیک دکارت و سوارز بررسی می‌کنیم. مطالعۀ تطبیقی این دو نظام مابعدالطبیعی نشان می‌دهد که چگونه ممکن است دو نظریه از مبانی واحدی متأثر باشند، اما به نتایج متضادی بینجامند. بنابراین، در ابتدا مفهوم نظریۀ اشرابی علیت را تحلیل خواهیم کرد، پس از آن با تکیه بر شواهد متنی تأثیر نظریۀ اشراب بر غایت‌شناسی سوارز و دکارت را آشکار خواهیم ساخت. سپس بررسی می‌کنیم که چگونه دکارت، با بسط نظریه علیت سوارز، ضرورت علّی (فاعلی) را تنها خیر در طبیعت در نظر گرفت. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| علیت؛ غایت‌شناسی؛ نظریه اشراب؛ دکارت؛ فرانسیسکو سوارز | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| متافیزیک | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Influx Theory on Descartes and Suárez’s Natural Teleology | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mohammad Ali Sultanmoradi1؛ Yousof Shaghool2؛ Gholamhosein Tavakkoli3 | ||
| 1Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| 2Associate Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran | ||
| 3Associate Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Proposing the theory of influx, Francisco Suárez argued that each of the four causes “inflows” its being into the effect. This theory takes the concept of four causes, especially the final cause, to be similar to the efficient cause. By this move, Suárez can account for God’s purposeless and free will as well as His purposeful action through nature. Influenced by Suárez’s theory, Descartes excluded the final cause from his philosophy, which paved the way for the mechanical explanation of nature. It was thus possible for a theory developed with theological objectives to provide the basis for the scientific explanation of nature. In this study, we examine the differences and similarities between Descartes’s and Suárez’s natural teleology. Comparing these two metaphysical systems reveals how two theories may be influenced by the same principles but produce contradictory results. Thus, we will first analyze the concept of the theory of influx. Following that, we present textual evidence to highlight the impact of influx theory on Descartes and Suárez’s natural teleology. Subsequently, we examine how Descartes took causal (viz. efficient) necessity as the only good in nature by developing Suárez’s theory of causality. Introduction Francisco Suárez proposed the influx theory. Some of Descartes’s philosophical writings also indicate that he presupposed the main principles of this theory. The influx theory reduces the characteristics of the four causes to the efficient cause. Comparing Descartes’s philosophy with that of a philosopher who influenced him has two positive aspects. Firstly, it provides insight into Descartes’s concept of finality, which is often overlooked by non-comparative studies. Secondly, it illustrates how two theories with different teleological viewpoints can share a common theoretical foundation. Discussion According to the influx theory, any property an effect possesses, including its existence must have been imparted by its cause. Therefore, each of the four causes contributes to the effect’s existence by inflowing its being into it. Consequently, the theory weakens the role of the other causes, especially the final cause, by making each of the four causes similar to the efficient cause. However, due to their differing paradigms, this theory appears differently in each philosopher’s teleology. There are theological reasons to undermine final causality in Suárez’s philosophy. Suárez believes that the key to understanding God as a free non-created being is to reject the possibility of His will being subjected to the influx of any cause. In his pursuit of this objective, Suárez employed various strategies to alter the traditional attitude toward causality. To begin with, Suárez denies the effect of the final cause on God’s will. He believes that, even though divine actions are purposeful, they can arise from a will that is not influenced by a final cause. Secondly, Suárez denies the purposefulness of natural elements’ actions. He argues that, due to their inherent necessity, elements’ actions “terminate” at some point. However, since God is the only agent responsible for nature’s movements, they can only reach their “terminus” if He approves. All nature is thus oriented toward the ultimate end of nature, which is the good of the whole, or, in other words, the manifestation of God himself. As a result, Suárez can maintain a sense of purpose for the system of nature without asserting the purposefulness of God’s will. Descartes’s natural theory is also rooted in theology. He regards the immutability of God’s acts as a theological axiom that deserves inclusion in a scientific philosophy. He further argued that the belief in the purposefulness of nature’s components is a result of childish imaginations and caused by ignorance of the real laws, mostly derived from efficient causation, that govern nature. Therefore, if we believe that bodies have a purposeful nature, it is necessary to accept that a sick body’s desire against its health is actually out of its nature and misleading. In his opinion, stating this would mean that God has instilled a deceptive power in our souls, a position he disagrees with. Consequently, we should not rely on teleology but rather explore and uncover nature’s mechanistic laws. In Descartes’s natural philosophy, the true good is the absence of any disturbance in God’s immutability as the true efficient cause of the universe. For this reason, we should exclude teleology from philosophy and focus on efficient causes in nature. Despite the many theoretical benefits of studying efficient causation as the only means of explaining nature, this approach, especially in its Cartesian form, may have some drawbacks. Nature, according to Descartes, is nothing more than God’s actions, so it would also be purposeless if God’s actions were aimless. Therefore, Descartes’s claim that the natural system proves God’s goodness and perfection may be deceptive. In this context, one may ask if we should accept that God’s actions have no purpose in Descartes’s philosophy. However, upon comparing Descartes and Suárez’s teleology, it is evident that there is no deception involved. It is important for Suárez to distinguish between the ends of the divine will and the natural system in order to emphasize the unique agency possessed by God. But the Cartesian version of this theory does not require a distinction, because it does not consider “the good” as the purpose of God’s acts. Descartes posits that divine acts are not purposeful, but rather identical to the good. In other words, God’s actions are not oriented towards a particular purpose or end but are inherently good in and of themselves. As a result, he dissolves the issue of how God’s actions relate to the good, instead of solving it. Conclusion We are confronted with two distinct causal theories, both derived from the influx theory. One of these theories, which sees theological issues at the top of its priorities, advocates preserving divine freedom in its entirety. It also maintains the purposefulness of nature in a relatively modest manner. However, to provide a certain foundation for science, the second theory accords primacy to the immutable and necessary laws of nature. This places the immutability of natural laws on the same level as natural purpose. This means that God’s actions as well as natural phenomena are inherently perfect, without the need for a specific goal or purpose. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| causality, mechanism, freedom, Rene Descartes, Francisco Suárez | ||
| مراجع | ||
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