تحلیل و بررسی دیدگاه ویلیام لین کریگ در باب نسبت دین و اخلاق | ||
| پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 26، شماره 2، تیر 1403، صفحه 55-78 اصل مقاله (2.1 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.10145.2981 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| رضا نقوی* | ||
| دکتری فلسفه دین، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| در این مقاله به بررسی دیدگاه ویلیام لین کریگ در باب نسبت دین و اخلاق می‌پردازیم. از نظر کریگ، معرفت به ارزش‌ها و تکالیف اخلاقی ابتنائی بر خداباوری ندارد، زیرا خداوند وظایف اخلاقی را در قلب تمام آدمیان نگاشته است. با این حال، در ساحت هستی‌شناختی، بهترین تبیین برای واقع‌گرایی اخلاقی خداباوری است. واقع‌گرایان خداناباور، اگر بخواهند از مغالطۀ طبیعت‌گرایانه اجتناب بورزند، باید واقعیات اخلاقی را از سنخ هویات انتزاعی افلاطونی، مانند اعداد و گزاره‌ها، بدانند. در مقابل، خداباوری نیازی به تمسک به هویات افلاطونی ندارد؛ زیرا خداوند، به مثابه موجود انضمامی، خیر اعلی و منشأ هر گونه خیر اخلاقی است. در نقد دیدگاه کریگ بیان می‌شود که (1) ویژگی واقعی معادل با امر ماهوی نیست، و بنا بر یک خوانش از مور، محمولات اخلاقی جزء معقولات ثانیه فلسفی‌اند و به عین وجود موضوعات موجود هستند؛ (2) می‌توان، با تمرکز بر وجود «شر اخلاقی»، استدلال کریگ را معکوس نمود و استدلالی به نفع وجود شیطان نیز اقامه کرد؛ (3) لازمۀ استدلال کریگ نفی هر گونه تکلیف اخلاقی از خداناباوران است؛ (4) اطاعت از امر خدا، به خاطر امر خدا، نامعقول است و کریگ پاسخ مقنعی به اشکال دور نمی‌دهد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| واقع‌گرایی؛ ناواقع‌گرایی؛ خداباوری؛ خداناباوری؛ هویات انتزاعی؛ معقولات ثانیۀ فلسفی؛ ویلیام لین کریگ | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه اخلاق | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Analysis and Examination of William Lane Craig’s Viewpoint on the Relationship between Religion and Ethics | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Reza Naghavi | ||
| Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion, Allamah Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| This paper scrutinizes William Lane Craig’s perspective on the relationship between religion and ethics. According to Craig, knowledge of moral values and obligations is not inherently tied to theism, as he posits that God has embedded moral obligations within the human heart. However, in terms of ontology, Craig contends that theism provides the best explanation for moral realism. Atheistic realists, in avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, are urged to conceptualize moral properties as abstract Platonic entities akin to numbers and propositions, a stance unnecessary within the theistic framework where God, a concrete entity, serves as the supreme good and ultimate source of moral goodness. Critically assessing Craig’s viewpoint, the paper contends that 1) real property should not be conflated with an essential constituent. Drawing on Moore’s perspective, moral predicates are construed as second-order philosophical concepts inherently tied to the existence of subjects. 2) By centering on the existence of “moral evil,” Craig’s argument can be inverted, providing grounds for an argument supporting the existence of Satan. 3) The consequence of Craig’s argument is the negation of any moral obligation for atheists. 4) Positing obedience to God’s command solely for its own sake as irrational, Craig’s argument may potentially exhibit circular reasoning. Introduction The inquiry into the relationship between religion and ethics remains an active concern within the realm of philosophy of religion. William Lane Craig seeks to advocate for a novel iteration of the Divine Command Theory. According to Craig, knowledge of moral values and obligations is not inherently tied to theism, as he posits that God has embedded moral obligations within the human heart. However, in terms of ontology, Craig contends that theism provides the best explanation for the existence of moral values and obligations. This article aims to undertake a critical analysis and assessment of Craig’s framework. We will assert that Craig’s theory relies on a distinctive interpretation of moral realism, one that is subject to controversy. Additionally, his assertions exhibit certain inconsistencies and ambiguities, rendering his approach susceptible to scrutiny. Ontological dependence of ethics on religion As per Craig, moral realism involves acknowledging the existence of sui generis moral properties, such as goodness, love, justice, mercy, etc., serving as exemplars of moral concepts. Consequently, atheism is deemed insufficient in explaining moral realism, given its naturalistic stance that denies the presence of non-natural elements in the world. Thus, the only recourse for atheism to circumvent moral non-realism is to propose that moral properties be considered as abstract entities rather than concrete entities, placing them within a Platonic realm. However, this proposition is deemed unsound, as Craig highlights the principle of supervenience, indicating that moral properties supervene upon natural properties. Atheists must contend that moral properties, as abstract and non-natural entities, supervene upon concrete and natural entities. Craig argues that abstract and concrete entities differ significantly, rendering it irrational to assert that moral abstract entities supervene upon natural concrete entities. In contrast, theism posits that every moral good mirrors the existence of a perfect good (God) and, akin to God, possesses a concrete existence. Consequently, theism does not encounter the challenge of abstract entities supervening over concrete ones. Epistemological independence of ethics to religion According to Craig, ethics maintains epistemological independence from religion. This assertion stems from the belief that God has inherently instilled moral principles and laws within the hearts of all individuals, irrespective of their theological stance—be they theist or atheist. Consequently, every human possesses an innate awareness of God’s moral directives and prohibitions, rendering the knowledge of moral values and obligations detached from theism or scriptures. As a result, atheists can lead a moral life comparable to that of theists. Discussion The primary critique levied against Craig is his assertion that atheists confront a binary choice: they must either reject the existence of any moral properties (embracing non-realism) or adopt a Platonic perspective regarding the existence of moral properties. This dichotomy appears flawed, as atheists can potentially adopt a third option, positing that moral predicates are second-order philosophical concepts and cannot exist independently of the existence of subjects. This aligns with Moore’s stance in the ontology of ethics, where he contends that moral predicates, such as “goodness,” lack a natural essence perceptible through senses or an abstract existence in a Platonic realm. Instead, Moore argues that moral predicates are intrinsically tied to their subjects, existing in dependence on the existence of these subjects. Moreover, the potential to posit the existence of God through the appeal to moral goodness opens the door to arguing for the existence of Satan by invoking moral evils. All the premises that Craig assembles to establish the existence of God could equally serve to demonstrate the existence of Satan. In conclusion, if Craig persists in asserting that moral realism holds no significance within an atheistic framework, then he must also acknowledge that sincere atheists bear no moral obligations and cannot be censured for immoral actions, even though, from an objective moral standpoint, their behavior might be deemed erroneous. Craig appears unwilling to accept the ramifications of his theory. Conclusion Craig’s interpretation of the Divine Command Theory lacks defensibility as it relies on a flawed dichotomy between nihilism and Platonism. However, there exist other rational interpretations of moral realism beyond these two extremes, as mentioned earlier. Additionally, Craig’s viewpoint contains inconsistencies that render the theory implausible. On one hand, he maintains that in a world devoid of God, moral values and obligations must be dismissed, yet on the other hand, he argues that atheists are still bound by moral obligations and should be held accountable for their actions. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| realism, non-realism, theism, atheism, abstract entities, second-order philosophical concepts, William Lane Craig | ||
| مراجع | ||
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