دلایل هنجاری پایه بنیادگذار و تبیین‌کنندۀ وضعیت تکلیف اخلاقی انتخاب‌ها | ||
| پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| دوره 26، شماره 2، تیر 1403، صفحه 5-30 اصل مقاله (2.13 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2024.10239.2995 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| حسین اسناوندی1؛ محسن جوادی* 2 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. | ||
| 2استاد، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| فلسفۀ اخلاق هنجاری به ارزیابی اخلاقی انتخاب‌ها می‌پردازد تا انتخاب‌هایی که «باید» انجام دهیم قابل تشخیص شوند. مطابق دیدگاه دلیل‌بنیاد در نظریات هنجاری، امور واقع دربارۀ دلایلْ بنیادگذار و تبیین‌کنندۀ امور واقع دربارۀ آنچه «باید» انجام دهیم است. در این مقاله نشان داده می‌شود که از این منظر، وضعیت تکلیف اخلاقی یک انتخاب -که به زعم ما اشتقاقی از وضعیت تکلیف هنجاری آن انتخاب است- بر اساس آنچه مُدل پایۀ اصلاح‌شده می‌خوانیم تعیین‌پذیر است. مُدل پایه از خروجی وزن کردن مقادیر وزنی دلایل هنجاری پایه در یک موقعیت بهره می‌گیرد تا وضعیت‌های تکلیفی واجب، ممنوع و جایز را از هم متمایز سازد. در دفاع از فرضیات فوق، اشکال‌هایی وارد می‌شود که به آنها می‌پردازیم. این اشکالات شامل کُل‌گرایی پروتنتو، یگانه‌گرایی دربارۀ منابع هنجاری، کثرت‌گرایی هنجاری، کُل‌گرایی در خصوص ترکیب‌پذیری و اشکال اختیارات می‌شود. پس از ارزیابی این اشکالات به هر یک پاسخ داده خواهد شد. در صورتی که استدلال‌های ما صحیح باشد، می‌توان به این نتیجه رسید که فرضیات مطرح‌شده قابل دفاع‌اند. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| دیدگاه دلیل‌بنیاد؛ دلایل هنجاری پایه؛ وزن کردن دلایل؛ دلایل همۀ-جوانب-در-نظر-گرفته-شده؛ وضعیت تکلیفی | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه اخلاق | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| An Option’s Moral Deontic Status is Grounded and Explained by Basic Normative Reasons | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Hossein Asnavandi1؛ Mohsen Javadi2 | ||
| 1Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran | ||
| 2Professor, Department of Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Normative ethics determine the options we ought to choose by ethically evaluating actions. In reason-based theory, the facts of what one ought to do are grounded and explained by virtue of the facts about reasons. According to this view, we demonstrate that the moral deontic status of options, which is derived from the normative deontic status of options, is determined by weighing the amount of normative weight of the basic practical normative reasons and based on the modified basic model. The modified basic model uses the weight of an unqualified all-things-considered reason for each option in a given situation as the input variables. To support our assumptions, we address the objections raised by opponents. These objections, respectively, include pro-tanto holism, source monism, normative pluralism, non-compositional holism, and the problem of normative options (merely permitted options). After evaluating these objections, we conclude that our assumptions will be defensible. Introduction The main aim of normative ethics is to give practical guidance to the agent. Practical guidance means determining the option’s moral deontic status. To determine the moral deontic status, we regarded the reason-based view. In this view, what “ought” to be done is grounded and explained by practical normative reasons. In this article, not “normative reasons” but “basic normative reasons” are considered to determine an option’s moral deontic status. Practical normative reasons In general, a practical normative reason is defined as a consideration that counts in favor of the action. Pro tanto and all-things-considered reasons: In a situation, a pro tanto reason can overcome or be defeated by another pro tanto reason, but the final consideration that must be taken into account in that situation depends on the all-things-considered reason. Normative reasons have direction and weight. A reason for action can only have two directions: in favor of or against an action. The feature of weight can carry numerous amounts. Basic normative reasons and pro-tanto holism objection Pro tanto reasons can be divided into two categories: derivative and non-derivative reasons. Derivative reasons do not have a normative force by themselves; they obtain it from the basic reasons. In this article, we defend the atomistic view against the holistic view. Holism and atomism about pro tanto reasons are rival accounts about the sensitivity of reasons to the context of an action. In the atomistic view, a consideration in favor of the action remains a reason in any situation, but in the holistic view, that consideration may not be a reason or even be considered a reason against the action. Because the defense of holism is usually done through argument from examples, we have shown that holism counter-examples cannot be extended to non-derivative or basic reasons. Moreover, by accepting the pluralist approach to basic reasons, the examples of holism can be explained from an atomistic perspective. Unqualified all-things-considered reason Sources pluralism is a common idea that believes that various normative sources (for example, ethical and prudential normative sources) provide different normative reasons. Source monism does not confirm this idea, but the monism objection does not seem to be correct because the same reason can have different explanations from the prudential standpoint than the moral standpoint. In addition, the same fact can provide conflicting prudential and moral reasons. Do reasons related to different normative sources (types of qualified reasons related to a normative field) that are relevant to a situation ground an unqualified all-things-considered reason and a plain ought? The answer to this question is negative in terms of normative pluralism. We have rejected normative pluralism because of its counterintuitive implications. The argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons shows why it is counterintuitive. Therefore, a good moral theory must determine the “moral ought” base on unqualified reasons. Weighing the basic reasons and the problem of non-compositional holism In this part, we have shown that the normative weight of all-things-considered reasons can be calculated with the additive theory. The problem of the non-compositional holism to additive theory does not apply to basic reasons and is therefore untenable. Weighing the reasons by the additive method: The most natural and closest view to common morality is to hold that the weight of reasons is the amount of normative support. In the additive method, the weight of each reason is added together in case of the same direction and subtracted otherwise. Problem of non-compositional holism: Based on this problem, the additive theory cannot explain cases where the combination of reasons with the same direction does not increase the weight of individual reasons. Critics have cited examples to illustrate these cases. According to these examples, non-compositional holism does not accept that the sum of the weights of the reasons is equal to the sum of the weights of the individual reasons because the combination of reasons can be very complex. In response to the above counter-examples, the additive theory must be modified in such a way that the reasons used in that method limited to basic, independent, or non-overlapping reasons. Determining the normative deontic status based on the modified basic model The basic model provides the most common way to determine the permitted and the required or the forbidden options, respectively, according to sufficient and decisive reasons. When the unqualified all-things-considered reason for an action has the greatest weight in competition with the weights of the unqualified all-things-considered reasons for alternative actions, our reason for doing that action is decisive; on the other hand, we have sufficient reason to perform an optional action when the unqualified all-things-considered reasons for alternative actions do not have more weight in that situation. The objection from normative options: The basic model is very simple compared to what is in the real world and cannot explain more complex normative and moral phenomena. On this basis, the objections from “merely permissible options” and “agent-centered options” are proposed and challenge the basic model. We believe that by adding more details to the basic model without fundamentally revising the structure of the basic model, these problems can be solved well. (In this article, we only dealt with the merely permissible options.) Merely permissible options: According to the basic model, the only way to explain merely permissible options or latitude is when the weight of the reasons for each action in a situation is equal. If we explain merely permissible options in this way, then it must be a rare phenomenon, but we know that latitude is very common. Moreover, in many situations, we are allowed to ignore an option supported by stronger reasons and to choose an option supported by weaker reasons. We responded to this problem by converting the absolute equality or superiority of the weights of the reasons into threshold equality or superiority. This response does not require a fundamental revision of the basic model because what “must” be done is still what there is the most reason to support. Conclusion The moral deontic status of each option is determined by the modified basic model. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| reasons-based view, basic normative reasons, weighing reasons, all-things-considered reasons, deontic status | ||
| مراجع | ||
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