Libertarianism and Luck | ||
| پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| مقاله 7، دوره 24، شماره 3 - شماره پیاپی 93، مهر 1401، صفحه 115-134 اصل مقاله (2.03 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2022.8297.2723 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Ishtiyaque Haji* | ||
| Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| Keywords Agent-causal؛ event-causal؛ luck objection؛ modest Libertarianism؛ weighting reasons | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| فلسفه عمل | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Libertarianism and Luck | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Ishtiyaque Haji | ||
| Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Agent-causal, event-causal, luck objection, modest Libertarianism, weighting reasons | ||
| مراجع | ||
|
Clarke, R. (2000). Modest libertarianism. Philosophical Perspectives, 14, 21–45.
Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian accounts of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (2011). Alternatives for libertarians. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will, 2nd ed (pp.329-348). New York: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1963). Action, reasons, and causes. Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685–700. doi: 10.2307/2023177 Dennett, D. (1978). On giving libertarians what they say they want. In D. Dennett (Ed.), Brainstorms (pp.286-299). Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
Fischer, J. M. (1995). Libertarianism and avoidability: a reply to Widerker. Faith and Philosophy, 12, 119–125. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199512123
Fischer, J. M. (2011). Indeterminism and control: an approach to the problem of luck. In M. Freeman (Ed.), Law and neuroscience, pp.41-60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M. (2014). Toward a solution to the luck problem. In D. Palmer (Ed.), Libertarian free will, pp.52-68. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: a theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Franklin, C. (2011). Farewell to the luck (and mind) argument. Philosophical Studies, 156, 199–230. doi: 10.1007/s11098-010-9583-3
Franklin, C. (2014). Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument. Philosophical Studies, 170, 413–432. doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0237-0 Franklin, C. (2018). A Minimal libertarianism: free will and the promise of reduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1987). Identification and wholeheartedness. In F. Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility, character, and emotions (pp.34-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haji, I. (2004). Active control, agent-causation, and free action. Philosophical Explorations, 7, 131–148. doi: 10.1080/13869790410001694480
Haji, I. (2012.) Modest libertarianism and practical reason. Philosophical Issues, 22, 201–216. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2012.00225.x
Haji, I. 2013. Event-causal libertarianism’s control conundrums. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 88, 227–246. doi: 10.1163/9789401210508_012
Haji, I. (2016). Luck’s mischief: obligation and blameworthiness on a thread. New York: Oxford University Press.
Haji, I. (2019). The obligation dilemma. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (1999a). On free will, responsibility, and indeterminism: responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele. Philosophical Explorations, 2, 105–121. doi: 10.1080/13869799908520971 Kane, R. (1999b). Responsibility, luck, and chance: reflections on free will and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy, 96, 217-240. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564666 Kane, R. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer, and Galen Strawson on the significance of free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 157–167. doi: 10.2307/2653436 Kane, R. (2002). Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free wil (pp.406-437). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2011). Rethinking free will: new perspectives on an ancient problem. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (381-404). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2013). Frankfurt-style examples and self-forming actions. In I. Haji, & J. Caouette (Eds.), Free will and moral responsibility (pp.58-73). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Kane, R. (2014). New arguments in debates on libertarian free will: responses to contributors. In D. Palmer (Ed.), Libertarian free will (pp.179-214). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2019). The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism, and volitional streams. Synthese, 196, 145-160. doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1046-8 Kane, R. (2021). Making sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism: a fourth way forward. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 23, 5-28. doi: 10.22091/JPTR.2021.7247.2595
Lemos, J. (2021). The indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 23, 137-156. doi: 10.22091/JPTR.2021.7187.2582 Levy, N. (2008). Bad luck once again. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, 749-754. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00219.x
Levy, N. (2011). Hard luck: how luck undermines free will and moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. (1995). Autonomous agents: from self-control to autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. (2008). A libertarian view of akratic action. In T. Hoffman (Ed.), Weakness of will from Plato to the present (pp.252-275). Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
Moya, C. (2015). Reasons and freedom. In A. Buckareff, C. J. Moya, & S. Rosell (Eds.), Agency, freedom, and moral responsibility (pp.79-93). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Usher, M. (2006). Control, choice and the convergence/divergence dynamics: a compatibilistic probabilistic theory of free Will. Journal of Philosophy, 103, 188-213. doi: 10.5840/jphil200610343
Watson, G. (1975). Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 205–220. doi: 10.2307/2024703 | ||
|
آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 552 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 463 |
||