تحلیل دیدگاه آگوستین دربارۀ پارادوکس منون و نظریه یادآوری | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| مقاله 3، دوره 23، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 88، تیر 1400، صفحه 53-74 اصل مقاله (6.38 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2021.6913.2538 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| محسن بهلولی فسخودی* | ||
| استادیار پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| افلاطون، «پارادوکس منون» را به عنوان یکی از مهمترین چالشهای نظری دربارهٔ یادگیری مطرح کرده است. بر اساس پارادوکس، تحقیق و یادگیری دربارهٔ آنچه شخص نمیداند، ناممکن و دربارهٔ آنچه میداند، بیفایده است. افلاطون برای حل این پارادوکس، «نظریهٔ یادآوری» را مطرح کرده است. مطابق این نظریه، یادگیریْ همان یادآوری دانش از پیش موجودی است که روح آدمی در امتزاج با بدن آن را فراموش کرده است. آگوستین، نظریهٔ یادآوری را قانعکننده نمییابد و معتقد است که نور الهی چیزهای معقول را نزد ذهن حاضر ساخته و سبب شناخت آنها میشود؛ بی آنکه نیازی به دانش ذاتی یا وجود پیشین روح در جهانی دیگر باشد. به عقیدهٔ برخی مفسران، دلیل اصلی این رویکردْ دشواری پذیرش حیات پیشین روح به عنوان اصلیترین مولفه نظریهٔ یادآوری است. پرسش پژوهش این است که آیا موضوع حیات پیشین روحْ تنها راه ورود برای درک درست موضع آگوستین در قبال نظریهٔ یادآوری است؟ و آیا تنها راه نزدیک شدن به فهم بهینه از تغییر رویکرد معرفتشناختی آگوستین، برگرفتن موضع هستیشناختی دیگر در میانهٔ سایر آرای مطرح شده است؟ ادعای پژوهش آن است که خوانش فلسفهٔ زبان و نشانهشناختی آگوستین مدخلی تازه به نظریهٔ اشراق الهی به مثابه راه حلی بدیع برای پارادوکس منون بگشاید. هدف پژوهش، تحلیل و تبیین این ادعا با تاکید بر رسالهٔ دربارهٔ آموزگار آگوستین است. در این رساله، او تاکید دارد که کلمات برای انتقال اندیشه ناکافیاند و ذهن با دانشی که از آموزگار درونی خود دریافت کرده به مرتبهٔ اشراق و درک جهان میرسد. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| پارادوکس منون؛ یادآوری؛ یادگیری؛ اشراق؛ روح؛ آگوستین | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| An Analysis of Augustine’s Views on Meno’s Paradox and the Theory of Recollection | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mohsen Bohlooli Faskhoodi | ||
| Assistant Professor, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Plato has identified Meno’s paradox as one of the most important theoretical challenges to learning. Meno’s paradox is that research and learning about what one does not know is impossible and about what one knows is useless. To solve this paradox, Plato proposed the Theory of Recollection. According to this theory, learning is the recollection of pre-existing knowledge that the human soul has forgotten in mixing with the body. Augustine does not find the Theory of Recollection convincing. Of course, the relationship between Augustine’s position and Plato’s view that knowledge is a recollection is very vague. According to Augustine, learning is not simply the mere receipt of information, but the ability to recall what we already know. Contrary to the early days of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that the example of Socrates’ question and answer with a slave cannot show the correctness of the Theory of Recollection. Augustine’s reflections on the book of The Confessions also show that remembrance involves the a priori existence of the soul. But in the second half of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that divine light brings rational things to the mind and causes them to be known without the need for innate knowledge or the pre-existence of the soul in another world. Some commentators believe that the main reason for this approach is the difficulty of accepting the past life of the soul as the main component of the Theory of Recollection. But there is no consensus among them on the timing and quality of Augustine’s change of approach. According to Gilson, Augustine never categorically disproved the notion that the soul existed before the body, and never explicitly referred to where the soul existed before the body. According to Teske, in the second period of his intellectual life, Augustine retreated from the Theory of Recollection as he had put it in his earlier writings. From O’Daly’s point of view, nowhere in Augustine’s writings can one find an explicit comment on the past life of the soul. The research question is whether the subject of the pre-existence of the soul is the only way to understand Augustine’s position on the Theory of Recollection? In other words, is the only way to get closer to an optimal understanding of Augustine’s change of epistemological approach, to take another ontological position among other opinions? The research claims that the reading of Augustine’s philosophy of language and semiotics opens a new entrance to the theory of divine enlightenment as a novel solution to the Meno paradox. In fact, instead of ontologically, the focus of Augustine’s discussion is on the discussion of language and its ability to convey meaning, real teaching, and learning. According to this linguistic approach, nothing can be learned through words and questions and answers. Therefore, unlike Plato, he concludes that learning is not the same as recollection, but the understanding of knowledge and realities of the outside world is done with the help of the light of the inner teacher, God. Augustine called this thesis divine enlightenment. The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain this claim by emphasizing the treatise on Augustine’s “The Teacher”. In this treatise, he talks about the nature of language and its role in teaching and learning. In this treatise, he emphasizes that words are insufficient to transmit our thoughts and ideas to another, and therefore, the mind reaches the level of enlightenment and understanding of the world with the knowledge it has received from its inner teacher. As a result, enlightenment of the mind by God provides the best explanation for the Theory of Recollection | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Meno’s Paradox, Recollection, Learning, Illumination, Soul, Augustine | ||
| مراجع | ||
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