خودآگاهی و ارتباط آن با عقلانیت ؛ دفاعی از نظریهٔ شفافیت ریچارد موران | ||
| پژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی | ||
| مقاله 3، دوره 22، شماره 1، فروردین 1399، صفحه 53-77 اصل مقاله (8.31 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22091/jptr.2019.4917.2225 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| زهرا سرکارپور* | ||
| دانش آموخته دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| همهٔ ما این شهود را در خود داریم که گویی خودآگاهی، نوع خاصی از معرفت است که با دیگر معرفتهای ما متمایز است. انگیزهٔ فیلسوفان برای پرداختن به این موضوع به عنوان یک مسئلهٔ فلسفی غالباً همین تمایز یاد شده است و آنان همواره تلاش داشتهاند تا ماهیت این معرفت خاص را توضیح دهند. در بین نظریههای خودآگاهی، نظریههای عقلگرا، این معرفت خاص را بر اساس ارتباط آن با عقلانیت توضیح دادهاند. به ادعای هواداران این رویکرد و نظریه، برخوردار بودن ما از قوای عقلانی، ارتباط مهمی با خودآگاهی و خاص بودن آن دارد. در این مقاله - پس از معرفی کلی نظریههای عقلگرایانه در بحث خودآگاهی - به تحلیل نظریهٔ شفافیت ریچارد موران، به عنوان یکی از موفقترین نظریههای عقلگرایانه خواهیم پرداخت و در ادامه، به یکی از چالشهای مهمی که همواره پیش روی این نظریه قرار داشته است، اشاره خواهیم کرد و سپس راه حل جالبی را که متیو بویل برای حل این چالش و در واقع، تکمیل نظریهٔ شفافیت مطرح کرده است، معرفی و تحلیل خواهیم کرد. و در پایان نیز ضمن اشاره به برخی ضعفهای این راه حل، دو پیشنهاد آزمایشی برای پیشرفت این راه حل و در واقع، پیشرفت نظریهٔ شفافیت، ارائه خواهیم داد. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| خودآگاهی بنیادی؛ عقلانیت؛ نظریهٔ شفافیت؛ ریچارد موران. خودآگاهی و عقلانیت؛ تأملگرایی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Self Knowledge and its Relationship with Rationality; Defending Richard Moran's Transparency Theory | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Zahra Sarkarpour | ||
| PhD Comparative philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Introduction The discussion of “self-knowledge” as a philosophical issue begins with an intuition. This intuition is based on the fact that our knowledge of our mental states or our knowledge in relation to statements like: “I know that I am happy,” is a particular knowledge that is distinct from the rest of our knowledge. It seems that in order to gain knowledge of ourselves, we do not need to go through those processes that we go through in order to gain knowledge about the external world or knowledge of other minds. We feel that we directly know our own mental states. The role of self-knowledge philosophers is to explain this type of particular knowledge. Theories such as the Inner Sense Theory, the Acquaintance Theory, inferentialism, or theories with a rationalist approach are presented in response to this issue. Considering theories such as the Inner Sense Theory and the Acquaintance Theory, we will find that a common aspect of these theories is that self- knowledge has been defined as a product of an internal observation of our mental states. Such an approach is a kind of Empiricism in self-knowledge. The Rationalist approach has been raised against this approach. This approach, by linking self-knowledge with rationality, has opened a new chapter in the discussion of self-knowledge. The foundation of this approach is based on the principle that our situation as a rational agent plays a fundamental role in self-knowledge. Rationalists believed that this ignorance of the fundamental role of rationality in self-knowledge has caused Empiricists to ignore the most important kind of self-knowledge that is associated with rationality. Tyler Burge, Richard Moran, and Matthew Boyle are some of the important philosophers who theorize about this kind of self-knowledge. Goal In this paper, we will first introduce the main components of Rationalist approaches because we want to review the theoretical literature of this approach. Then, we will bring up a summary of the Tyler Burge view, a famous and important philosopher of the rationalist approach. This is an introduction to introduce Moran's Theory of Transparency which is the focal point of our discussion. We will then refer to one of the most important challenges facing the Transparency Theory and bring up a significant solution that is presented by Matthew Boyle. We will also show that despite the advantages of this solution, there are ambiguities and other challenges. Finally, we will try to set up two proposals as a way to advance Boyle’s solution. Conclusion The perspective of rationalist philosophers about the existence of a kind of self-knowledge in rational creatures seems to be a powerful idea that is difficult to oppose. Tyler Burge presented interesting arguments about this issue. But it is not easy replying to the question of how this kind of self-knowledge occurs. The theory of Transparency and Reflectivism were proposed to respond to this question. Although they have been considered as efficient theories; however, the mentioned problem still remains ambiguous and complex. Transparency denied the introspective self-knowledge, but couldn’t explain how transparent self-knowledge occurs and therefore, it does not provide a complete explanation for self-knowledge. Some vagueness and some important challenges still continue to exist in this theory. Finally, we propose two proposals as a complement to Boyle’s theory. Maybe they could advance this theory. We suggest that we can use the concept of non-conceptual belief and dispositional belief. These debates have the potential for solving some of the challenges of Transparency and Reflectivism. These are profound topics and need great reflection. We know that our proposals are very elementary and crude ideas. But perhaps they can be a way toward developing the Transparency and Reflectivism theories. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Fundamental self-knowledge, rationality, transparency, reflectivism | ||
| مراجع | ||
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